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A b s tr a c t
We stu d y  th e  effects of co rru p tio n  on econom ic grow th  in  a fram e­
work th a t  includes co rru p tio n  as p a r t  of th e  in s titu tio n a l se ttin g  of 
countries. U sing a form al grow th  fram ew ork w here co rru p tio n  affects 
labo r in p u ts  and  th e  provision of public goods, we find th a t  p a r tic u ­
larly  in  s itu a tio n s  w here in s titu tio n s  are no t well developed co rru p tio n  
m ay be conducive to  grow th. In  these instances th e  positive effect of 
co rru p tio n  on th e  w orking of th e  in s titu tio n a l system  outw eighs the  
negative d irec t effects of co rru p tio n  on grow th. We also find th a t  the  
in te rac tio n  am ong in s titu tio n s  them selves m atte rs . T his underscores 
th e  im portance  of tak in g  in to  account th e  com plete in s titu tio n a l se t­
ting  w hen study ing  co rrup tion , b o th  in  theo ry  as well as in  em pirics.
1 Introduction
T he U nited N ations’ top  anti-crim e official, A ntonio Costa, estim ates th a t 
Zaire and  Nigeria, two of A frica’s hardest-h it states, have lost some $5 billion
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each in th e  last few years to  corruption. In  Pakistan , an estim ated  30 percent 
of th e  price of all public works projects goes to  kickbacks and  bribes, while in 
Bangladesh corruption eats up about half of all foreign investm ents (Steven­
son, 2003). B ut corruption is not only a third-w orld phenom enon. W hile it 
is undeniably more prevalent in au th o rita rian  less developed countries, also 
dem ocratic, w estern societies are not free of corruption. For exam ple, a 2002 
parliam entary  enquiry in th e  N etherlands showed th a t th e  D utch construc­
tion  industry  partic ipa ted  in illegal practices, ranging from fraud, unjustified 
subsidies and license issuance to  real b ribery  and money or favours to  indi­
vidual politicians or higher-ranking public servants (van den Heuvel, 2005). 
Overall, a W orld B ank In s titu te  s tudy  estim ates th e  costs due to  corruption 
in b o th  rich and  developing countries to  be a $1000 billion a year (World 
Bank, 2004). O ther studies show th a t corruption is detrim ental to  grow th 
as it lowers dom estic investm ents (M auro, 1995), th e  inflow of foreign di­
rect investm ents (Wei, 1997), in ternational trad e  (Lambsdorff, 1999) or the  
productiv ity  and  quality  of public investm ent projects (Tanzi & Davoodi, 
1997). Furtherm ore, Mo (2001) shows th a t corruption creates sociopolitical 
instability  which, by creating uncertainty, lowers p roductiv ity  and  economic 
growth.
Empirically, there  is broad  consensus th a t corruption is detrim ental to  the  
economic perform ance of countries on th e  long term . This is in sharp contrast 
w ith th e  theoretical litera tu re  on corruption and  growth. For a long tim e cor­
rup tion  was trea ted  as a s tandard  distortion. W ith  corruption, resources are 
spent on bribery  instead of production, reducing th e  efficient allocation of re­
sources and  ham pering economic growth. However, there  are also alternative 
views. Leff (1964), for instance, argues th a t those criticizing corruption often 
seem to  have in m ind bureaucracies th a t are working to  prom ote economic 
development. B ut if governm ents are prim arily  in terested in reaching o ther 
goals (e.g. staying in control, self-enrichm ent), a re-evaluation of th e  effects 
of corruption m ay be w arranted. B ribery then  allows entrepreneurs to  gain 
influence on th e  decision-making process, fostering economic perform ance by 
reducing uncertain ty  and supporting  th e  innovative activities of en trepre­
neurs. A sim ilar view is expressed by H untington (1968), who stresses the
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role of corruption in greasing th e  wheels of bureaucracy. B ribery  can be an 
effective way of surm ounting laws or regulations th a t ham per economic ac­
tiv ity . B y th e  same token: when governm ent procedures are dilatory, speed 
money m ight help to  speed up bureaucratic  decision making. Finally, it is 
argued th a t corruption enhances grow th due to  bribe bidding com petition. 
As more efficient entrepreneurs can afford to  offer higher bribes, corruption 
facilitates th a t projects are assigned to  th e  m ost efficient firms (Beck and 
M aher, 1986; Lien, 1986).
These views are not uncontested. M yrdal (1968) argues th a t th e  practice 
of speed money gives incentives to  governm ent officials to  not act efficiently 
and is therefore one of th e  reasons behind th e  inertia  of bureaucratic  systems. 
R egarding th e  alleged benefits of bribe bidding, Baum ol (1990) stresses th a t 
those who can afford th e  highest bribe should be considered th e  most suc­
cessful in rent-seeking. C orruption reduces grow th because th e  most able 
individuals will pursue rent-seeking activities ra th e r th a n  socially productive 
activities. M urphy, Schleifer and  V ishny (1991) substan tia te  th is argum ent 
in a m odel of entrepreneurship  and  growth.
A m ajor draw back of th e  theoretical litera tu re  is th e  fact th a t it disregards 
com pletely th a t th e  relationship  between corruption and  grow th depends on 
its institu tional environm ent. If a t all, m ost au thors depict th e  institu tional 
framework as a black box, or s tudy  one particu lar in stitu tion  in isolation, 
m aking it im possible to  analyze corruption in interplay w ith  o ther in s titu ­
tions.1 However, it is well-known th a t a close web of formal institu tions, in­
formal institu tions and  distortions determ ine th e  way an economy functions 
(e.g. N orth, 1990). Rem oving one distortion  m ay alter th is  web, so th a t o ther 
d istortions m ay be triggered, leaving th e  economy worse off.2 Consequently, 
th e  effects of corruption in a particu lar society cannot be studied w ithout 
tak ing  into account (the rest of) th e  in stitu tional framework of th a t partic ­
ular society. C orruption will have different effects in different institu tional 
settings and th e  effects of corruption on th e  economy will therefore differ
1For instance, M auro (2002), Mo (2001), A idt, D u tta  and  Sena (2008), B arreto  (2000) 
and Ehrlich and  Lui (1999).
2This line of reasoning is in line w ith the  theory  of second best, see e.g. Bohm  (1967).
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from place to place and from time to time. It implies that the outcome of a 
certain reasoning should become dependent on the institutional setting one 
has in mind. Studying corruption without taking heed of the interdependen­
cies between corruption and other institutions, as the theoretical literature 
does, is therefore inappropriate and may moreover lead to wrong inferences.
W ith this paper, we provide a theoretical framework that gives institu­
tions a decisive role in determining the effects of corruption on economic 
growth. As we will show, this provides ample reason to expect ambigu­
ous findings from the theoretical literature (be it for different reasons). In 
addition, it provides a theoretical underpinning for recent findings in the em­
pirical literature that the impact of corruption cannot be explained without 
taking into account the institutional setting of countries.3 Ignoring the inter­
dependency between corruption and other institutions tends to downplay the 
cross-country variance in the relationship between corruption and growth.
The model we develop takes these vital interdependencies into account. 
In particular, we construct a two-layer model to emphasize the decisive role 
of the institutional environment, including corruption, on the effects of cor­
ruption on growth.4 The first layer models the way corruption affects the rate 
of growth in an institutional vacuum. In the second layer, institutions are 
incorporated and modelled to assess how corruption affects economic growth 
through its impact on the institutional setting. Our two-layer model thus 
not only captures the commonly acknowledged direct effect of corruption on 
growth (layer 1), but also introduces a crucial indirect institutional effect of 
corruption (layer 2).
3Heckelman and Powell (2008) present an overview of the various empirical studies that 
have examined the corruption-growth relationship. They show th a t these studies, which 
generally ignore institutional measures, provide very mixed outcomes. Recent empircal 
studies have begun to  examine corruption’s impact on economic growth including the 
institutional environment in the analysis. They empirically show th a t institutions play a 
significant role in explaining the non-monotonic corruption-growth relation. Interesting 
results are provided by Méon and Sekkat (2005), Méon and Weill (2006), Méndez and 
Sepulveda (2006), and Aidt, D utta and Sena (2008). Note th a t this is in contrast to 
the earlier empirical studies which always found a clear-cut negative relationship between 
corruption and growth.
4The concept of using a two-layer model is taken from Ehrlich and Lui (1999), who 
develop a two layer model to  analyse the implications of political systems on individual 
labour supply decisions.
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For the remainder of this paper it is important to be clear about what we 
understand under corruption. Corruption has been defined by several authors 
in different ways, but we adopt the definition of Macrae (1982). He refers to 
corruption as ‘an arrangement that involves an exchange between two parties 
(the demander and the supplier) which (i) has an influence on the allocation 
of resources either immediately or in the future; and (ii) involves the use or 
abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends’ (Macrae, 1982, p. 
678). This definition is in line with the World Bank definition that corruption 
is ‘the abuse of public power for private benefit’, but is preferred because it 
highlights that there are two parties involved, a briber and a bribee. Besides 
this, Macrae’s definition makes clear that the bribee uses his public position  
for the benefit of his own or his relations and that it affects the allocation 
of resources.5 Consequently, we focus on bureaucratic corruption, involving 
both a public and a private party. Furthermore, we note that in our treatment 
of corruption, we refrain from issues of morality and solely study the economic 
effects of corruption, in particular economic growth.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 establishes in more de­
tail why corruption cannot be reliably addressed in an institutional vacuum. 
Section 3 introduces our modelling framework and establishes the impact of 
corruption on economic growth when also the indirect institutional effects 
of corruption are taken into account. Section 4 extends our analysis to ver­
ify how outcomes depend on the particular political system that is in place, 
emphasizing the interdependency of institutions. Section 5 verifies what our 
analysis implies for social planning in the wake of corruption. Section 6 
concludes.
5Further refinements of the definition are of course possible. For instance, one can make 
a distinction between corruption with and without theft, where the official does or does 
not tu rn  over the official price of the good to  the government. One can also distinguish 
between centralized and decentralized corruption. Centralized corruption means th a t once 
a bribe is paid, the buyer gets full property rights over the set of government goods that 
it buys. In decentralized corruption one bribe may not be sufficient to  render effect.
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2 C orruption and th e  in stitu tion a l settin g
In a purely neoclassical setting, transactions occur under the assumption of 
frictionless exchange, in which property rights are perfectly and costlessly 
specified and information is likewise costless to acquire. Neoclassical theory 
has been a major contribution to economic knowledge and seems to work well 
in the analysis of markets in developed countries. However, when its stringent 
underlying assumptions are not satisfied, neoclassical theory fails to satisfac­
torily explain economic performance. What has been mainly missing is an 
understanding of the nature of human coordination and cooperation. When 
information is not perfect and when property rights are far from perfectly 
specified, cooperation is hard to realize. This is where institutions come in. 
When it is costly to transact, institutions matter.
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 1990). 
The major role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a sta­
ble structure for human interaction.6 They provide a framework in which 
transactions and cooperation can occur under conditions that would oth­
erwise make it extremely difficult or even impossible. Institutions can be 
both formal and informal. Formal rules function to facilitate socially de­
sired kinds of exchange and to discourage the less desirable kinds (e.g. laws, 
contracts). These formal rules are typically supplemented by codes of con­
duct, norms of behaviour and conventions. These informal institutions are 
endogenous, embedded in the culture of a society, and change very slowly. 
Because formal rules deal with specific problems only and can never be ex­
haustive, both formal and informal institutions are essential for the working 
of societies. Moreover, the institutional framework is a complex system of 
formal and informal constraints in which only incremental changes will alter 
the institutional framework over time.
6This does not mean th a t the institutions are necessarily efficient. Laws and social 
norms may be inefficient, but they still perform a role in the society by reducing uncer­
tainty. By reducing uncertainty, individuals will engage in cooperation despite the fact 
th a t they do not possess perfect information about the other players or despite the fact 
th a t the game is not repeated.
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Affecting the transaction costs of economic interactions, institutions are 
bound to influence economic performance of countries. Economic litera­
ture shows a wide array of studies on the issue of institutions and economic 
growth.7 However, when studying the relationship between institutions and 
growth, authors generally follow the notion of North (1990) that institu­
tions affect economic performance by their effect on the cost of exchange 
and production. Together with the technology employed, they determine 
the transaction and transformation costs that make up the total costs of 
production. Production becomes a combination of the normal technological 
transformation process and a part that defines the way transactions occur.8 
This last part depends on the institutional framework of a country. Good 
institutional settings promote economic growth by establishing an environ­
ment in which transactions occur under trust and order. Property rights are 
well established and people do not need to devote a lot of resources to mea­
surement and enforcement. In such a setting, routines will be established. 
By contrast, bad institutions hamper economic growth because a large share 
of resources has to be used for accomplishing transactions, leaving fewer re­
sources for the actual transformation process and discouraging individuals to 
undertake productive activities.
The relationship between institutions and economic growth is not only 
subject of descriptive argumentations, it also has been formalized and em­
pirically examined. Fedderke (2001) constructs a growth model in which 
property rights are the institutional feature affecting economic growth. He
7 Why the interplay between institutions m atters for economic growth is described by 
Granovetter (1985), addressing the problem of embeddedness. Which institutions m atter 
for growth is outlined in Rodrik (1999). Eicher and Garcia Penalose (2003) argues th a t a 
certain threshold level of institutional development has to  be overcome, before economic 
growth can take off. The importance of a specific feature of the institutional framework, 
namely property rights, for economic growth is stressed by Gradstein (2004) and Furubotn 
and Pejovich (1972).
8Nelson and Sampat (2001) follow this line of reasoning by proposing th a t the theory of 
production should involve two different aspects: a recipe th a t is anonymous regarding any 
division of labour, and a division of labour plus a mode of coordination. They propose 
th a t the former is what scholars often have in mind when they think of technology in 
the conventional sense. This aspect is called the ‘physical’ technology employed. The 
latter aspect, which involves the coordination of human action, is referred to  as the ‘social 
capital’ involved.
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argues that there is a mutual interdependence between institutional devel­
opment and economic development. The model follows the aforementioned 
notion that the level of production depends on the degree of development of 
production technology and on the level of property rights and it formalizes 
that improving institutions positively influences the rate of economic growth. 
Empirical testing provides plenty evidence for this conclusion. Rodrik, Sub- 
ramanian and Trebbi (2002) conclude that the quality of (formal) institutions 
is by far the most important determinant of differences in income levels be­
tween countries. In a less recent study, Scully (1988) incorporates informal 
institutions into the analysis and reports that the institutional framework is 
not only a statistically significant explanation for intercountry variations in 
growth rates of real per capita gross domestic product, but also that it is a 
phenomenon of considerable magnitude.
While the relationship between institutions and economic growth seems 
clear and straightforward, one should also realise that the institutional set­
ting of a country is a close web of formal institutions, informal institutions 
and distortions. The interplay between these institutional factors determines 
whether the institutional environment fosters or depresses growth. In con­
trast to a neoclassical world in which all resources are used efficiently and 
where distortions hamper growth by definition, a more realistic picture of 
distortions and economic growth is provided by the concept of second-best.9 
In a second best world, removing one distortion may trigger other distor­
tions, leaving the economy worse off. The effect of removing distortions on 
economic growth thus depends on the way the total institutional framework 
changes.
This concept also applies to corruption. In a second best setting, it is by 
no means certain that removing corruption promotes economic growth. The 
effect on growth also depends on the way the removal of corruption alters 
the institutional setting as a whole. Corruption may be a useful element in
9Bohm (1967) argues th a t the problem of second best applies in the real world because 
“the optimal-feasible allocation of resources is subject to  an abundance of ‘irremovable’ 
institutional and political constraints, which seem to require other solutions to  most alloca­
tion problems than  what follows from a simple Pareto optimum with no other constraints 
taken into account than  those of technology and available resources.” (p. 301)
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the institutional web, mending or precluding other distortions. Removing 
corruption may then affect the economy adversely. This notion is generally 
missing in economic theory concerning corruption and growth, while empiri­
cally it has recently been established as relevant (e.g. Méndez and Sepúlveda, 
2006; Aidt, Dutta and Sena, 2008; Heckelman and Powell, 2008). Economic 
literature does consider institutions, but always as an exogenous factor. It 
forgets that corruption itself, being a distortion, affects the relationship be­
tween institutions and growth. The total effect of corruption on growth 
should therefore consist of two separate effects. Apart from the obvious di­
rect impact of corruption on growth (e.g. due to misallocation of resources), 
there is also an indirect effect through its impact on the institutional frame­
work. This combination of a direct effect and an indirect institutional effect 
determines whether or not corruption depresses growth. By means of the 
direct effect, reducing corruption will be conducive to growth, but by the in­
direct institutional effect reducing corruption may imply lower growth rates 
after all.
The difficulty with incorporating these notions in economic modelling is 
that the institutional web is often depicted as a black box. While it is easy 
to acknowledge that the interplay between institutional factors determines 
the way institutions affect growth, it is much harder to make that tractable 
in economic modelling. In order to adequately model the effects of corrup­
tion on economic growth, one would have to open the black box and specify 
the interdependencies. This problem is also recognized by Bohm (1967), 
who argues that without specifying the policy restrictions that arise with 
second best problems, it is impossible to argue how the allocation in a sec­
ond best framework is different compared to a first best allocation. For our 
purposes, this implies that the aspects of the institutional setting that af­
fect the relationship between corruption and growth should be acknowledged 
and specified. The model would then be able to elucidate in a meaningful 
manner the impact of corruption on the institutional environment, specifying 
the conditions under which the indirect institutional effect compensates the 
direct stealing effect, making it possible to indicate which effects removing 
corruption has on economic growth.
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Since the institutional web of a country is extremely complicated and 
specific, it is impossible to analyze all interdependencies that influence the 
relationship between corruption and growth. We therefore highlight three 
institutional features that we believe are crucial in studying the effects of 
corruption on growth, i.e. political stability, property rights and the polit­
ical system. We motivate our choice by the fact that these features have 
been acknowledged in several papers as being important determinants for 
growth.10
To illustrate that the institutional effect may be more than enough to 
compensate the stealing effect, we imagine a situation in which society is 
plagued by either low political stability or the absence of a decent system  
of property rights. In such a setting, a corrupt system may be the least 
of all evils, particularly in countries where ethnic differences and violent ri­
valries are pervasive, so that the perceived alternative to corruption is not 
Western-style political confrontation, but daily physical aggression (Colom- 
batto, 2003). Efforts to eliminate corruption will then lead to political insta­
bility since corruption serves the positive function of holding society together. 
Also, when a decent system of property rights is missing, corruption may be­
come a crucial element of the economic system. In such infected environment, 
corruption could reduce uncertainty and facilitate investments and produc­
tion, thus providing an alternative system in which the indirect institutional 
effect of corruption more than compensates its negative stealing effect.
For political systems, it particularly matters whether corruption exists 
in a democratic system or in a totalitarian system .11 The key characteristic 
of the neoclassical paradigm that it is socially optimal if individuals strive 
to maximize there own benefit applies to democratic systems. Corruption 
is a distortion, misusing resources and infecting economic agent’s incentives.
10 The importance of property rights for economic growth can be found in Gradstein 
(2004). Colombatto (2003) presents the political system and the degree of political stability 
as a crucial determinant for the relation between corruption and growth.
11The perception indices in both Tanzi (1998) and Mauro (1995) show th a t countries 
with a totalitarian system have lower scores than  countries with a democratic system, 
indicating th a t corruption is more present in a to talitarian system than  in a democratic 
one. Given our focus on the effects of the policital system on the corruption-growth 
relationship, this is by itself not so relevant though.
10
Of course, also modern democratic systems are far from the neoclassical 
ideal and welfare states have been designed to protect vulnarable groups. 
This creates room for corruption, also since politicians are subject to fairly 
loose controls. Corruption can then be a useful monitoring device, eliciting 
predictable behaviour (Colombatto, 2003). This applies only in the short 
run, however, as in the long-run bureaucrats will change their behaviour in a 
way that will reduce efficiency (Myrdal, 1968). In democratically orientated 
systems, corruption is therefore detrimental to growth.
This is different in totalitarian systems, where economic and political 
freedoms are limited. In particular the distinction between centralized and 
decentralized corruption is important. When corruption is decentralized, 
economic agents cannot be certain that bribing will be effective. Bribing 
one government official may not prevent that also other officials have to be 
bribed to get something done. Uncoordinated corruption leads to high de­
grees of uncertainty, lowering economic growth. Centralized corruption, by 
contrast, takes away these uncertainties as corruption has been institution­
alized to serve a clear, common goal. In a way, producers can hedge the 
risks of uncertainty, knowing whom to bribe to secure production. In such 
system, corruption could be conducive to growth, especially when other in­
stitutions cannot provide for this. The distinction between decentralized and 
centralized corruption is related to Mancur Olson’s (1993) distinction be­
tween “roving bandits” and “stationary bandits”. While roving bandits are 
dictators trying to extract from society as much as possible, a “stationary 
bandit” realizes that the high levels of uncertainty this implies affects future 
earnings.
3 A  basic m odel for corruption and grow th
In this section we construct a model that acknowledges the direct and indi­
rect effects corruption has on growth. We develop a two-layer model where 
the first layer models the direct stealing effect of corruption on economic 
growth and the second layer corruption’s indirect institutional effect through 
its interplay with other institutions. The first layer can be seen as the con­
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ventional treatment of corruption as a distortion, whereas the second layer 
acknowledges that corruption also affects economic growth through its im­
pact on the working of the institutional system.
3.1 T h e  first layer — co rru p tio n  and  gro w th  in  an  in­
s t itu tio n a l vacu u m
The first layer follows Mauro (2002), who models corruption as lowering 
production and hampering the rate of economic growth. Mauro’s line of 
reasoning is based on the well-known Barro (1990) framework, where public 
goods are provided by the government and act as an input for private pro­
duction. Private returns to scale may be diminishing, but the social returns 
can be constant or increasing. Mauro incorporates corruption in this model 
as rent-seeking, altering the growth rate.
The economy consists of economic agents who try to maximize overall 
utility, as given by:
U = /  u(c)e~ptdt (1)
J 0
where c is per capita consumption and p represents the constant rate of time 
preference. The consumption good is produced by economic agents using 
capital, labour and public goods G, specifically Y  = F ( K , L ,G ) .  This last 
feature represents the productive role of government in the model. How­
ever, the incorporation of the role of the government also creates room for 
bureaucratic corruption. Economic agents will attempt to use some of the 
public goods for their own benefit, instead of using them for production. In 
the model, individuals allocate their time between productive work, L , and 
socially unproductive stealing, S . Corruption therefore has two effects on 
output: due to rent-seeking, less tim e will be devoted to productive work, 
while it also implies that less public goods reach the production process as a 
productive input. Specifically,12
12In the construction of the production function we depart from Mauro in the sense 
th a t Mauro introduces a term  0(S) representing the amount of stolen goods th a t the rent- 
seekers actually keep. This is assumed to  be a positive function of the to ta l amount of
12
Y  = K  1- aL a [G(l -  S)]a (2)
Individuals allocate their time between productive work and rent-seeking. In 
equilibrium, the net wage must equal the marginal product of rent-seeking. 
For an individual, the marginal product of rent-seeking is G. When the 
government produces more public goods, rent-seekers can consequently ap­
propriate a larger amount of these public goods. The marginal product of 
labour is the wage net of taxes which is (1 — r ) d Y / d L .  Using equation (2), 
we get
@Y Y
@l  = a ~L
Since the net wage must equal the marginal product of rent-seeking, the 
equilibrium value of L becomes:
L  =  1 — S  = a(1 — r  ) —
G
Substituting this value of L  into the production function, subsequently de­
riving the marginal product of capital d Y / d K , gives rise to the following 
growth path:
7  =
(1 — r  ) d Y / d K  — p
a
1
a (1 -  r )(1 -  a)
Y
a(1 ~  r )  G
(*)
1—a f  1 \  1—a
Y
[G(1 -  S )] 1-a  -  p
'---------V---------}
(**)
3)
which is essentially a tax-ridden Euler equation with 1 /a  representing the in­
rent-seeking in the economy, reflecting the concept of strategic complementarities: if one 
agent does something, it becomes more profitable for other agents to  do the same thing. 
Because of this, the Mauro-model results in multiple equilibria: a good equilibrium with 
no rent-seeking and a bad equilibrium with a considerable amount of rent-seeking. Given 
the focus of our analysis, we want to  rule out the possibility of a good equilibrium and 
therefore set 0(S) =  1.
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tertemporal substitution elasticity in consumption. The expression is by and 
large similar to the one derived by Mauro (2002),13 making clear that rent- 
seeking impedes economic growth. It lowers the amount of public goods that 
reaches the production process (the **-term), while it also reduces agents’ 
optimal labour input (the *-term, equalling 1 — S ). By that token, the 
inclusion of corruption also leads to an additional effect of government ex­
penditures on growth. In addition to the Barro (1990) effects of government 
expenditures on economic growth -  G  makes capital more productive but the 
implied tax burden also implies lower labour input -  increasing government 
expenditures also creates more room for corruption. This leads to an increase 
in rent-seeking and consequently to a decrease of productive work.
3.2 T h e  secon d  layer — in co rp o ra tin g  in stitu tio n s
To incorporate the indirect institutional effect of corruption on growth, we 
extend the basic set-up with a second, institutional layer. Following Klein, 
Welfe and Welfe (1999), we extend the production function with an extra vari­
able, in our case the importance of the institutional framework for growth. 
However, we also acknowledge that corruption may either facilitate or ob­
struct the working of institutions. Consequently, as before we model produc­
tion as a function of capital, labour and public goods, but augment it with a 
variable Q i(S ) that signifies the influence of the (quality of the) institutional 
framework on growth, while acknowledging that corruption is part of it:
Y  = K  1- aL a [G(1 -  S)]“ • Q i(S)  (4)
Institutions are a necessary condition to produce and production is enhanced 
if institutional quality increases. Corruption - o r  stealing as we have modelled 
it -  influences institutional quality, be it not necessarily in an adverse way. As 
we have argued, in societies where institutions are hardly present or do not 
function properly, corruption may serve to replace the lacking institutions’
13The difference is the absence of the strategic complementarity term  0(S) as a premul­
tiplier of the G terms in (3).
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functionality and by that have a positive effect on production. By contrast, 
in societies where institutions function properly, corruption has a detrimental 
effect on production as it obstructs the functioning of normal institutions. 
Labelling the former situation as corrupt and the latter as normal, we model 
Q i(S ) as
Q i(S) = Qi + qi S  (5)
with i 2  f N (ormal),C(orrupt)g. In this formulation Qi denotes society’s 
general institutional quality level (e.g. law enforcement) and qi determines 
how this institutional quality is affected by stealing. Given our discussion 
in the previous section, we assume that in corrupt societies stealing has a 
positive impact on institutional quality, and a negative effect in normal soci­
eties: qN < 0 <  qC. Moreover, we assume that society’s general institutional 
quality is lower in corrupt societies than in normal societies, Q N > Q C.
Our set-up can be easily applied to specific institutions, for instance po­
litical stability or property rights protection. Both can be seen as necessary 
conditions for production and development. As argued, in a situation of 
political stability one has a certain amount of trust and confidence, which fa­
cilitates investment and production. Political in stability is therefore bound 
to reduce production and may even transform into a situation of anarchy 
and physical aggression. Also the degree of property rights protection is a 
key feature of the institutional setting. W ithout a proper system of property 
rights, the economic system is plagued by severe uncertainty and a functional 
system of property rights is therefore regarded as vital to economic growth. 
However, corruption may take over the role of both institutions. In a situa­
tion of high political instability, for instance, corruption is one way to hold 
the economic system together, or to avoid the system to explode. By the 
same token, when a decent system of property rights protection is lacking, 
corruption may affect growth positively by taking over the role of property 
rights.
For the growth rate, the incorporation of an indirect institutional effect 
of stealing implies that now also an effect arises through its impact on insti-
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tutional quality:
1
1  =  -  <a
(1 -  T )(1 -  g )J1 -  S ] ^ ^  (y ^ )
*
a 1
x[G (1 -  S )]^  \Qi +  qiS] -  p
a
(6 )
As before, stealing affects growth directly by affecting labour input choices 
(*) and by diminishing the availability of public good provision for private 
production (**), but now also by an indirect institutional effect (the ***- 
term). This effect depends on societal circumstances: it will be negative for 
normal societies (qN < 0) and positive for corrupt societies (qC > 0). Note 
that there is no additional impact of stealing through its effect on optimal 
labour choices since labourers do not take the indirect effects of stealing into 
account when making their choices.
The overall effect of stealing on growth is ambiguous. Stealing reduces 
growth because of its negative direct effects, but due to its indirect institu­
tional effect it may nevertheless be positive for growth after all. Formally, 
the effect of stealing on the growth rate is given by
s ^ s _  a i  +  p s  f (1 _  s ) _  t ?  o (7)
d S  1  (1 -  a) a i  1 -  S  \  Q i +  qiS  
A necessary condition for the (total) effect of corruption on economic growth 
to be positive is qi > 0; corruption can only have a positive indirect effect in 
societies where normal institutions are absent or do not function properly. 
In such societies corruption may enhance growth provided (a) labour is not 
too important in production (a  is small), and/or (b) when stealing S  is 
not too large.14 In that case, the negative direct effects of stealing through 
labour choices and public good provision are small compared to the positive 
effect stealing has on the quality of the institutional framework. In addition, 
corruption is more likely to be positive for growth the lower the general 
quality of institutions Q i.
We illustrate the overall effect of stealing on growth in Figure 1, where we
14The first term  in braces of (7) declines in S.
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have set qN =  —1 and qC =  +1 for convenience. The curve labeled 7 N shows 
growth as a function of stealing for a normal society; the curves labeled 7 C 
for a corrupt society. For normal societies, growth diminishes when stealing 
increases, leading to negative growth rates if stealing is too pervasive. For 
corrupt societies, stealing may however be conducive to growth. Given qC =  
1, this is the case for S  < S C =  (1 — 2a Q i) /(1  +  2a), where S C is positive if 
and only if 2aQ i <  1. Indeed, for stealing to have a positive effect on growth 
labour should not be too important in production while general institutional 
quality should be sufficiently low. We illustrate this by displaying a curve 
for 7 C for which institutional quality is too high for stealing to be conducive 
to growth (7hCi9h Q) and one for which it is sufficiently low (7 C™ Q). Also in 
corrupt societies too much stealing will affect growth negatively, leading to 
negative growth rates if it becomes too pervasive.15
Figure 1 also illustrates that, in the presence of stealing, growth may 
be higher in corrupt societies than in normal societies. This is a logical 
consequence of the fact that in corrupt societies the indirect institutional 
effect of stealing is positive, where in normal societies it is negative: 7 C > 7 N 
if S  > S  = (Q n  — Q C) /2  >  0. One implication is that in societies where, for 
whatever reason, stealing is more pervasive, it may be advantageous to opt 
for a corrupt society. We will come back to this issue in the next section.
A final point is the evolution of institutional quality over time. Provided 
government pursues a policy of balanced budget at all times, which we as­
sume, the growth rate of public good provision is always equal to that of 
aggregate output, implying that the marginal revenue of rent-seeking changes 
in tandem with the marginal revenue of productive work. Consequently, the 
levels of L  and S  that are chosen are always the same, implying an ex­
treme form of path dependency. Whether corruption facilitates or hampers 
economic growth depends on society’s initial situation. If that situation is 
such that corruption facilitates growth, it will always do so unless exogenous 
shocks or policy actions induce changes in the initial setting.
15The level of S for which growth rates become negative is however higher for corrupt 
societies than  for normal societies, as can be easily verified by setting the growth rate in
(6) to  zero, recognising th a t qc = —qN .
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(insert Figure 1 about here)
4 T he politica l sy stem  and corruption
In this section we apply our two-layer framework to analyze to what ex­
tent the political system matters for the impact of corruption on economic 
growth. The analysis we offered so far can be seen as resembling the out­
comes of corruption in a democratic system. No individual agent has power 
over other agents, whereas the role of government is limited to producing 
and distributing public goods. But also the political system, as part of the 
institutional setting, may have consequences for the relation between cor­
ruption and economic growth. As we discussed in Section 2, the effects of 
corruption in democratic systems are different from those in totalitarian sys­
tems, whereas also the particular form of the totalitarian system is relevant
-  Mancur Olson’s (1993) distinction between "roving bandits” and “station­
ary bandits” . Regarding government spending and taxation the distinction  
between "roving bandits” and “stationary bandits” is clear from the follow­
ing quote from Olsen: “Their (stationary bandits) thefts were distinguished 
from those of roving bandits only because they took the form of continuing 
taxation rather than occasional plunder. [...] The rational stationary bandit 
will take only a part of income in taxes, because he will be able to extract 
a larger total amount of income from his subjects if he leaves them with 
an incentive to generate income that he can tax.” (Olson, 1993, p. 568). 
"Roving bandits" are therefore characterized as dictators trying to extract 
from society as much as possible without taking heed of future implications; 
“stationary bandits” realise that future earnings are doubtful if individual 
agents are not left incentives to produce.
To analyze these different set-ups we retain our assumption that govern­
ment collects taxes and produces public goods, facilitating private produc­
tion. When there is a democratic government in place, outcomes are as in 
the previous section and require no further elaboration. The growth rate in 
the institutional vacuum is given by (3), whereas the growth rates when also
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institutional quality is taken into account is given by (6). When a totalitar­
ian system is in place, we assume that government - t h e  dictator - a ls o  uses 
tax income to serve needs that do not add to private production. When the 
dictator is of the roving bandit type, it will use all tax revenues for its own 
purposes, extracting as much from society as possible. This disables private 
production, obviously with disastrous effects on economic growth. For that 
reason, we will not further elaborate on the ’roving bandit’ type of totalitarian  
system. When the dictator is a ’stationary bandit’, things become different. 
Recognizing that public goods facilitate production, a stationary bandit will 
choose "the revenue-maximizing tax rate [...] and will spend money on public 
goods up to the point where his last dollar of expenditure on public goods 
generates a dollar’s increase in his share of the national income." (Olson, 
1993, p. 570).
Ignoring for now the impact of corruption on institutional quality, such 
optimisation stance improves economic growth when there is stealing. By 
rationally reducing public goods provision, the stationary bandit effectively 
reduces the amount of corruption in society, which is good for growth. To see 
this formally, we note that the marginal cost of public good provision equals 
one for the stationary bandit, whereas the marginal benefit is r (d Y /d G ) .  Of 
all tax revenues collected, stationary bandits will therefore spend G  =  r a Y  
on public goods, keeping the remainder selfishly for themselves. Everything 
else the same, public good provision is less under a stationary bandit than 
in a democratic society. This reduces the amount of stealing that is going on 
and increases the amount of labour individuals decide to supply:
L (1 -  r) > (1 -  r) T L s b  =   >  a  =  L  
r r
where L SB is optimal labour input under the stationary bandit regime and 
where the value for T is taken from Section 3. Moreover, we have applied 
G  =  r a Y  in case of the stationary bandit and G  =  r Y  in case of the 
democratic system. Using this in the growth function yields
1
7 SB =  _a
(1 -  r )(1 -  a)[a(1  -  r ) L s b ] 1-“ -  P
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which is higher than the equivalent growth rate in a democratic system .16.
We note that this growth rate is also higher in comparison to a society 
where a democratic government would set public expenditures and tax rates 
optimal for economic growth. In such society, which is the appropriate bench­
mark for the ’planning’ stationary bandit, government would set G / Y  =  r  
equal to a,  which is the natural efficiency condition for government expen­
ditures (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999: 155). This implies labour input of 
L  =  (1 — r ) <  L sb  . In the presence of stealing, however, the natural effi­
ciency condition for government expenditure changes to G / Y  =  a \J  1 — r .17 
Stealing implies that it is optimal to spend a lower percentage of national 
income on public goods, which the stationary bandit unintentionally honours 
by selfishly requiring a higher marginal benefit on public goods provision.
To infer the importance of the political system in an institutional setting, 
we verify the implications of having a stationary bandit for the second layer 
of our framework. Since we know that S SB < S , the effect of a stationary 
bandit on growth boils down to determining how the growth rate (6) changes 
when S  decreases. We recall from (7) that:
97 S -  a 7  +  P S  f  q‘(1 -  S > -  2a \ ?  0
9 S  7  (1 -  a) a 7  1 -  S  [ Q t  +  q S  
Whether or not a stationary bandit enhances growth when also other institu­
tions are taken into account thus depends on the quality of the institutional 
framework. From Section 3 we know that the effect of corruption on eco­
nomic growth is negative in normal societies, but also in corrupt societies 
when institutional quality Q C is sufficiently high. W ith S SB < S , a station­
ary bandit is therefore beneficial to growth in these situations. For corrupt 
societies with insufficient institutional quality, however, growth may thrive 
upon corruption. That is, provided stealing levels are not excessively high
-  S  < S c in terms of Figure 1 -  the actions of stationary bandits would be
16Eqn. (3) can be rewritten to  7  =  1 (1 — t )(1 — a)[a(1  — t)L]  1~q — p .
17Recognising tha t part of public good production dissipates because of corruption, the 
government sets (1 — S ) d Y /d G  =  1. The expression in the text then readily follows upon 
substitution of 1 — S  =  (1 — t )a Y /G .
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detrimental to growth. When stealing enhances growth because of lacking 
institutions, a stationary bandit is uncalled for. This also underlines the 
mutual dependence of different institutions for generating end-outcomes (for 
instance property rights protection or political stability).
5 Social p lanning in th e  wake o f corruption
Since the stationary bandit apparently has ’social planning’ qualities, it is 
worthwhile to compare the outcomes of a stationary bandit with a demo­
cratic government that also takes on a role as social planner, a so-called 
rational democratic government (RDG). The distinction between RDG and 
stationary bandits is of course that RDG takes aggregate output as a yard­
stick for social planning, whereas stationary bandits would maximize their 
own income. In our framework, several levels of social planning are possible 
and we distinguish two of them. First, we see social planning as a situation in 
which government acknowledges that in the presence of rent-seeking individ­
ual labour input decisions are suboptimal, determining the optimal division 
between labour and rent-seeking itself. Second, we analyze the consequences 
when government recognizes that both L  and S  are functions of G, optimis­
ing public good provision accordingly. Apart from that we also verify what 
policy options social planners have to increase growth.
A  so c ia l p la n n er  th a t  o p tim iz e s  la b o u r  su p p ly  ch o ices The societal 
optimal value of L  is obtained by setting the marginal product of labour 
equal to that of rent-seeking. For the RDG, the former is a ( Y / L )  while the 
latter is:18
d Y
~dS
Qi a Y
Q + S 1 -  S ' (8) .Qi +  QiS 1 S _
This differs from the marginal product of rent-seeking for the individual, 
which was simply G. Moreover, d Y / d S  may only be positive in the presence
18O utput also depends on stealing through the effect of stealing on G. This has no 
effect on the optimal labour input choice as we require balanced government budgets. G  
is therefore a fixed proportion of Y  th a t is independent of S .
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of an institutional externality, particularly if > 0. For the stationary 
bandit, the relevant comparison is between the marginal effect of stealing 
and working on the share of tax revenues it keeps for itself, (1 — a )r Y . The 
stationary bandit thus also optimizes L  by setting d Y /d L  =  d Y / d S  and 
chooses an optimal labour input that is the same as the RDG would choose. 
Hence,
l rdg  — l sb  — 2a 'yQi +  q S ] /q i (9)
Optimal L  is positively correlated with the presence of stealing in society 
only if qi > 0, as in a corrupt society. In that case, the positive externality 
stealing implies for institutional quality is internalized by both RDG and 
the stationary bandit. If this positive externality is absent, as in normal 
societies, the marginal benefit of stealing is negative and would imply an 
optimal labour supply choice of one.
Using the optimal value of L  from equation (9) in the growth function 
yields
(1 -  t )(1 -  a) 2a \Qi +  qiS ~\
qi
1—a G \  1~a 
Y
1  — -  a
> .
[(1 -  S ) l1-a  [Q{ +  qiS] 1- a -  p
(10)
The main difference with the growth equation we had before is that the di­
rect effect of stealing through its effect on labour input now also depends on 
the overall institutional quality of society, cf. the *-term in (10) with that 
in (6). This effect arises because the social planner acknowledges that steal­
ing has consequences for total output. Of course, stealing only contributes 
positively in corrupt societies, when qt > 0. This holds for both the RDG  
and the stationary bandit. The growth rate will nevertheless be lower with 
a stationary bandit in charge, 7 SB < 7 RDG. The stationary bandit provides 
less public goods -  G / Y  =  a r  as opposed to G / Y  =  r  for RDG -  implying 
that it was the planning part of the stationary bandit’s behaviour that made
1
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the difference before, not its selfishness.
A  so c ia l p lan n er  th a t  o p tim iz e s  p u b lic  g o o d  p ro v is io n  Suppose now 
that social planning involves choosing the optimal level of public good pro­
vision, thereby taking into account that individual labour supply decisions 
depend on G . This boils down to assuming that government equates the 
marginal cost and benefits of G , based on an aggregate production function 
that incorporates the individual optimal labour supply choices we derived in 
Section 3. Recalling from there that L  =  1 — S  =  (1 — r ) a Y / G  and ignor­
ing momentarily the impact of institutional quality on output, the relevant 
production function becomes Y  =  K  1-“ [(1 — r )a ]2“Y 2“G~“ . Rearranging 
gives
2 a  1 — a „  a ,
Y  =  [(1 —  r)a] 1- 2 a  K  1- 2 a  G  2 a - 1 (11)
For the stationary bandit the marginal costs of public good provision are 
one and the marginal benefits amount to r (dY=dG ). This implies
a r  
2a  -  1
which is positive only if a  > 1/2. Hence, labour must have sufficient weight 
in final good production to convince the stationary bandit to produce a 
positive amount of G. Provided this is the case, the stationary bandit will 
choose a higher level of G =Y  than when it did not take into account the 
positive impact of G  on stealing. To keep the stream of tax revenues in tact, 
the stationary bandit increases public good provision. In the absence of an 
institutional quality externality, this has no effect on growth rates though, 
as can be easily verified from (3).19
For the RDG, the marginal costs of public good provision are one while 
the marginal benefits amount to (d Y /d G ).  This yields
19The direct effect on output of higher G / Y  exactly cancels out against the effect of 
lower optimal labor input. This would of course be different had social planning involved 
choosing optimal G  from a growth perspective.
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a
2a  -  1
since balanced budget requires G  =  r Y  as well. Again, public good provision 
is positive if a  > 1=2, in which case G=Y  is also higher than before. Also for 
a RDG it thus holds that if it acknowledges that its outlays affect stealing, 
it will increase public good provision.
Investigating optimal public good provision when also institutional qual­
ity matters of course alters these results. The optimal labour supply choice of 
individuals remains the same, so that the production function is essentially 
the institution quality augmented version of (11):
2a 1 a a
Y  =  [1 -  r )a] 1- 2 a  K  1- 2a G 2a - 1 Q i [S(G)]
where Q i [S(G)] =  Q i +  qiS (G). The implications of including Q i [S(G)] in 
the production function may be verified from dY=dG :
—  =  +  ( 1 _  ) ( Y Y _  qi
dG 2a  — 1 G \ G J  Qi +  q iS (G)
since d S /d G  =  (1 — r ) a Y / G 2. The first term on the right-hand-side is 
the expression for dY=dG  in institutional vacuum. Including institutional 
quality therefore implies that if stealing affects institutional quality positively 
(qi > 0), d Y /d G  goes up. In a corrupt society, it is optimal for both RDG and 
the stationary bandit to increase spending on public goods. Since individual 
labour supply decisions do not take this externality into account, the impact 
on growth is however still zero, see (6).
A  so c ia l p la n n er  th a t  o p tim iz e s  g ro w th  Social planning may also in­
volve thinking about which system is optimal for growth. Referring back to 
Figure 1, it is clear that for high levels of stealing in society, a social plan­
ner would prefer a corrupt system, while for low levels of stealing, a normal 
society would be preferable. This goes for both a RDG and a stationary ban­
dit, as higher growth implies higher future tax revenues. The desirability of 
either system depends on the general institutional quality in both systems.
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The larger the difference, the smaller the range of S  values for which the 
corrupt system is desirable. In the figure this can be easily checked by com­
paring the points of intersection of both 7 C curves with the 7 N curve and 
what it implies for S,  the threshold level beyond which the corrupt system  
features higher growth rates.20
However, the level of stealing in society may not be optimal for growth. In 
normal societies, it is clear that growth is highest when stealing is zero. This 
is also the case in corrupt societies when the institutional effect is low enough. 
In corrupt societies, however, stealing levels may be too low from a growth 
point of view (S  <  S C) or too high (S  >  S C). In such societies fighting 
corruption is therefore not always optimal for growth. Of course, to the extent 
that corrupt societies coincide with high levels of stealing, fighting corruption 
is beneficial in corrupt societies as well. Apart from fighting corruption to 
increase growth, a social planner could also consider changing the general 
quality of society’s institutions Q i . Such endeavour would shift the growth 
curves in Figure 1 up, while also lowering S C , so that increasing general 
institutional quality increases growth for both types of society.
This begs the question what is more effective for boosting growth, fighting 
corruption or investing in better institutions? For high levels of stealing, it 
is clear that reducing stealing is more effective. For high S , the marginal 
impact on growth of reducing stealing is higher than the marginal impact of 
increasing Qi.21 For lower levels of S  this becomes different. For example, in 
the vicinity of SC , the effect of fighting crime on growth rates in the corrupt 
regime goes to zero and may even become negative, so that it is better to 
increase Q C. This also implies that in corrupt societies growth rate increasing 
strategies may have to change over time. W hile fighting corruption may be 
most effective to increase growth initially, below SC such a strategy becomes 
counterproductive and investing in institutional quality becomes the right 
strategy. To a much lesser extent this is also true in normal societies, since
20Recall th a t S  = (Qn  -  Q C)/2  >  0.
21The elasticity of 7  with respect to  S  is given by see (7) and goes to  —1  when S  !  1.
The elasticity of 7  with respect to  Q i equals -— 7 +  P—_ Q ---- , which is finite for all S.
(1 -  a) a 7  Qi +  qitS
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also then the relative effectiveness of improving institutional quality increases 
when stealing is reduced.
We finally note that when a social planner could choose both the optimal 
stealing level as well as society’s stance (normal, corrupt), Figure 1 makes 
clear it would choose the normal regime and S  =  0, as it can be easily proved 
that 7 n  | s = o  >  7 c  | s = S c  .
6 C onclusion
A major drawback of much of the empirical and theoretical literature regard­
ing corruption and economic growth is that it disregards that the relationship 
between corruption and growth depends on the institutional environment. 
While recent empirical papers report institutions to play an important role 
in the corruption-growth relationship, most authors depict the institutional 
framework as a black box, implying an impossibility to analyze corruption 
in interplay with other institutions. However, it is a close web of formal in­
stitutions, informal institutions and distortions that determines the way an 
economy functions. Removing one distortion may alter this web, triggering 
other distortions and leaving the economy worse off than before. The effect of 
corruption on economic growth can therefore not be studied without taking 
into account the rest of the institutional framework.
The model we develop in this paper tries to take (some of) these vital 
interdependencies into account. We construct a two-layer model in which the 
first layer treats the relation corruption-growth in an institutional vacuum, 
while the second layer adds institutional quality to assess how this alters the 
impact of corruption on growth. Institutions we have in mind are political 
stability and property right protection.
The model’s first layer can be seen as the conventional treatment of cor­
ruption as a distortion by showing that, in an institutional vacuum, cor­
ruption depresses growth by lowering both the input of productive public 
goods and labour. The relationship between corruption and growth becomes 
ambiguous, however, when institutions are taken into account in the second 
layer. Depending on societal circumstances, corruption affects the working of
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the institutional system either positively or negatively. Corruption can foster 
growth when its indirect effect through the working of the institutional sys­
tem is positive and more than enough to compensate for the direct negative 
effect following from the first layer. The model shows that for corruption 
to have a positive effect on growth, labour should not be too important in 
production while general institutional quality should be sufficiently low. The 
initial institutional environment is important for determining the corruption- 
growth relationship. In our set-up this path dependency takes an extreme 
form, since in steady-state the trade-off between work and corruption is con­
stant. If the initial situation is such that corruption facilitates or hampers 
growth, it will always do so unless exogenous shocks or policy actions induce 
changes in the initial setting.
Also the political system affects the corruption-growth relationship. Us­
ing our two-layer model to compare between corruption in a democratic so­
ciety and corruption in a totalitarian system, we find that in democratic 
societies the amount of corruption will be higher than in autocratic systems. 
Whether or not this promotes economic growth again depends on the initial 
societal, institutional circumstances.
It appears, however, that it is the planning part of the totalitarian au­
tocrat’s behaviour that makes the difference, not its selfishness. Ceteris 
paribus, a rational democratic government that acts as a social planner gen­
erates a higher growth rate than the totalitarian autocrat. These findings 
underline the mutual dependency of different institutions for generating out­
comes and proves our premise that corruption, being an institutional factor, 
should be studied in close interaction with other aspects of the institutional 
environment. The interaction between the political system and other insti­
tutions is important for the relationship between corruption and economic 
growth. The extension of our two-layer model with a political system can be 
seen as a first step in opening the institutional black box and in applying it 
to a formal growth framework.
This modelling framework allows us to analyse the efficacy of different 
corruption-fighting strategies. In societies plagued by high levels of corrup­
tion, fighting corruption may be most effective to increase growth initially.
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However, when corruption has some valuable effects on the working of in­
stitutions, maintaining corruption-fighting tends to be counterproductive in 
these societies. In the end, investing in institutional quality is the right path 
to growth.
Furthermore, our model provides an explanation for the ambiguous find­
ings in theoretical literature, just as it provides a theoretical underpinning for 
recent findings in the empirical literature that institutions may be a source of 
the found non-linearity of the corruption-growth relation. While results show 
that the corruption-growth relationship depends on the institutional envi­
ronment, authors generally ascribe this to Huntington’s greasing-the-wheels- 
hypothesis (e.g. Heckelman and Powell, 2008). Our modelling framework 
offers a deeper theoretical basis for understanding how corruption affects 
growth through the institutional framework, which empirical analyses could 
verify.
We would like to emphasize that our argumentation and modelling should 
be considered as a first attempt to formalize the view that institutional factors 
must be studied in close interaction with the entire institutional environment. 
Therefore, our analysis is all but complete and many challenges lie ahead. 
Furthermore, we have only partially succeeded in analyzing the interplay 
between several institutional factors. Our model also entails an extreme form 
of institutional path dependency, since only exogenous changes are capable 
of changing existing corruption-growth paths. We believe, however, that our 
modelling framework could serve as a useful guideline for future analyses of 
corruption, institutions and economic growth.
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